The two-sided reality of US-China relations is likely to be with us for a long time.... Let's hope it is, since the alternatives are probably worse.

A respected colleague of mine recently observed that the old days of annual Most Favored Nation/Normal Trade Relations (MFN/NTR) battles in the US Congress had their good points.

Ugly and hysterical as the MFN/NTR season was, he argued, at least it provided an issue around which supporters of a normal and stable commercial relationship with China could--and had to--organize themselves and forcefully present their case. Indeed, year after year, that case was accepted, in the sense that the US Congress never voted to close US markets to Chinese imports by denying MFN/NTR treatment for Chinese goods.

I am not one to yearn for the "good old days" of that grinding battle. And I do not think anyone in the US business community would seriously argue that we would be better off without permanent NTR and China in the World Trade Organization (WTO). While permanently unresolved public policy issues are the bread and butter of legions of income-earners in the nation's capital, I maintained from my first week at the US-China Business Council in 1994 that we could earn our livings without the MFN ritual, and of course that has turned out to be the case. China's uneven and complicated progress along the path to economic reform and development, including its implementation of WTO commitments, gives American businesses plenty to grapple with, and fires the US-China Business Council's consulting and informational services to its hundreds of corporate members. We are glad to be where we are today, as compared to where we were a few years ago.

And yet, there is something to what my colleague is saying. Absent a clear and present danger to which it must respond, the business community that sustains in such large measure the daily life of US-China relations watches from the sidelines as other forces jockey for the pilot's seat.

Today, the picture of US-China relations is mixed and formless. Political phrasemakers might complain about a "lack of vision," but that is just the jargon of political convenience. What we see is a murky mixture of dark and light. If, as Daoists since the time of Laozi have argued, that's the natural order--dark and light are intertwined, and you cannot have one without the other--then fine: let's just continue adjusting to the Daoist reality of US-China relations.

On the other hand, if dark has the ability to cloud and ultimately extinguish light, then we have a serious problem on our hands.

September 11, and the opportunities for US-China cooperation against terrorism that grew from it, helped to steer US-China relations onto a more positive trajectory after the traumas of 2001. Two visits to China by the president of the United States have provided the setting for both nations to demonstrate their willingness to work together on concrete tasks and to maintain clear and candid communication. The prospects of high-profile visits to the United States by Vice President Hu Jintao this spring and President Jiang Zemin in the fall represent further important commitments to a sustained, communicative relationship involving investments of time and concern by people in the most powerful positions in both countries.

Morever, after a period of curtailed activity, dozens of US government agencies are engaging with China again: The US-China Business Council is humming with consultative meetings, brainstorming sessions, and other useful engagements with US public agencies dedicated to expanding their cooperative engagement with Chinese counterparts. Members of Congress and their staff members are again travelling to China.

The US-China Interparliamentary Exchange is again moving ahead, thanks on the US side to the commitment and energy of its volunteer leader, Rep. Donald Manzullo of Illinois. There are signs of growing US-China cooperation and consultation on deeply troubling human problems like the HIV/AIDS threat. The US Federal Bureau of Investigation is opening an office for the first time in Beijing, auguring well for better US-China cooperation not only on terrorism, but on international crime, money laundering, and other issues.

The Council applauds all those in US public life who take the time to work on "engagement" with Chinese counterparts. And the Council applauds Chinese officials' demonstrated willingness to put time and effort into focused cooperation with their American counterparts on a wide range of issues.

Other recent signs are of more concern. In spite of--or perhaps, paradoxically, because of--recent re-engagement of the US and Chinese governments, developments in recent months have underlined how much remains sensitive and volatile.

American non-business views of China--in the media and elsewhere--have turned sharply darker, with widespread diagnoses of stalled reforms, faulty statistics, rising social instability, unmanageable corruption, and an elephantine heaviness of process that stifles any bold attempts at fundamental therapies. The prognosticators of crisis, and their promoter partners, are increasingly vocal, while the defenders of a more positive outlook keep their heads low, either because they do not think there is much to say or because they believe the price for saying it is for now too high.

There are plenty of points of US-China friction, on some of which US legislators will likely join together for the sake of "sending a message" or enacting new US law.

The most sensitive and difficult issues dividing the two countries have not been effectively defused: Taiwan, nonproliferation, and human rights. If there is brighter news out there, behind the walls of government confidentiality, this would be a good time to make some of it public.

There appears to be little political support for a stable bilateral relationship conceived of as beneficial to the security interests of either country, but there is much broader receptivity to a view of US-China relations predicated on the danger that each country poses to the security of the other. That, too, is a reflection of the passing of the trade agenda from the spotlight, leaving in the shadows the more positive aspects of the overall relationship.

A few vocal US observers even see China's membership in the WTO, and the improvement of China's economy that China itself hopes will result from WTO participation, as representing new threats to US economic and security interests.

In China, segments of the policy community continue to perceive the United States not only as the only world superpower but as the principal abuser of power in the world, and as the greatest obstacle to the attainment of China's highest stated policy objectives, specifically "peaceful reunification" with Taiwan.

This two-sided reality is likely to be with us for a long time. In fact, let's hope it is, since the alternatives are probably worse.

If you take the "light" view, then the occurrence of periodic irritations, even nasty ones, won't hurt the underlying relationship. Indeed, paradoxically, the growing sense on both sides that the relationship is finally strong enough to absorb shocks may even provide greater freedom to test the limits of the other side's patience on sensitive topics. In crude terms, "We know they're not going to get upset beyond the danger point, since we've agreed that we're critically important to each other, so let's maneuver some more--what can they do to us?"

The re-engagement in the autumn and winter of 2001 and 2002 gives some support to the view that momentary irritants can be managed without lasting damage. We even have gone now for a whole year without a new, full-blown crisis. Signs of enhanced cooperation between the United States and China have multiplied. Perhaps the newly reinforced relationship is already strong enough to cushion or absorb small disturbances.

But if you subscribe to the "dark" view, progress on one front can be stopped in its tracks by crisis on the other. If some sensitive issue can be ignited and can burn long enough, it can still damage the ties that have begun to link the two sides, throwing the consolidation process into reverse and setting off another round of recrimination and retaliation.

If that happens, the "good old days" of MFN/NTR debate, when business could make and win its case for holding US-China relations on track, will seem a quaint relic.

Ever the optimist, I am betting on the "light" option. But I won't win my bet by default. The factors that make the "dark" view credible are alive and active this spring, even without an MFN/NTR battle to keep champions of both views busy.