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Lee H. Hamilton
he
US-China relationship is the most complex bilateral
relationship for the United States. Over the last
30 years, Sino-American relations have undergone an
impressive transformation from animosity and conflict
to candid dialogue and constructive cooperation. These
two vast and complicated countries have found common
ground on issues of trade, investment and, more recently,
security. But key issues remain unresolved, and the
potential for troubling divergence is real as China
becomes an economic powerhouse, a military force in
Asia, and a potential rival to US hegemony.
The future of Sino-American relations is fraught with
questions. Will Taiwan declare its independence, or
will it be integrated into the People's Republic of
China? Will American missile defense trigger a Chinese
arms buildup, or will the two militaries strengthen
their ties and cooperation? Can China's one-party
system sustain itself in a market economy, or will
China undergo drastic political change? Will China
prove hospitable to human rights, or will it remain
a rigid, state-controlled society? Uncertainty about
these and other crucial questions is real, and momentous
choices remain for Chinese and American leaders. If
the last 30 years are taken as a guide, the leaders
of tomorrow can best face these challenges by constructively
engaging in pursuit of common interests.
The economic ties that bind
Overlapping interests between the United States and
China have been predominantly in the economic sphere.
China's drive to become an economic power has been
simply astonishing. Growth rates have frequently approached
10 percent per year over the past 10 years, and in
2002 China was the recipient of more than $50 billion
in foreign investment. There are now 2 million private
companies in China, an emerging middle class, and
ambitious infrastructure development projects. China
is a global center for manufacturing and a regional
economic power, particularly since the Japanese economy
has stalled. This level of economic openness and growth
in China was unthinkable 30 years ago and owes much
to the relationship between the United States and
China.
 On
trade and investment, there has been considerable
common ground and many areas of mutual interest between
the two countries. The United States has pursued commercial
opportunities, exports, and profits in China; China
has sought US investment, technology, and support
for Chinese accession into global trade regimes. US
support for trade and investment in China has matured
from Most Favored Nation status in the 1980s and 1990s
to China's integration into the World Trade Organization
(WTO) in 2001. China has in return demonstrated a
willingness to open up its state-owned economy, dramatically
reducing tariffs, overhauling laws and regulations,
and permitting greater private ownership, property
rights, and transparency.
China still has a long way to go in reforming its
economy, however. China's WTO compliance record so
far is mixed, and it must continue to improve protection
of intellectual property rights, remove import quotas
on agricultural goods, eliminate regulations that
discriminate against foreign products, and establish
more efficient and vigorous independent regulatory
agencies. China is also faced with ongoing problems
with inflexible state-owned enterprises, bad loans
in state banks, unfunded pension systems, and widespread
corruption. But today's vibrant and developing China
still bears little resemblance to the economy of the
early 1970s. The ties afforded by this development
have bolstered Sino-American relations beyond the
balance sheet: Americans and Chinese now do business
together, travel to each other's countries, indulge
in common sports and entertainment, and shop for the
same name brands.
Though economic cooperation has been increasingly
robust, the lack of political reform in China has
proven to be an impediment to strengthening Sino-American
ties. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has opened
the economy while maintaining a one-party state in
which power is concentrated in a few dozen individuals,
and dissent has been repressed. China is undergoing
a stunning modernization, but ordinary Chinese have
very little say in the process. This balancing act
has raised difficulties as the incompatibility between
a free market and one-party rule becomes evident;
China could be approaching a crisis in governance,
with a decay in the Party's authority, a deteriorating
state capacity, and rising tensions between the regime
and society. To many observers, it appears that China
has to implement some strategy of political reform
without delay, including legislative measures, legal
system elections, and an empowerment of civil society.
But the CCP is both determined and resilient, and
the choice between working with a largely repressive
entity or encouraging potentially destabilizing dissent
has proven difficult for American policymakers.
Political reform
The United States has struggled to advance the cause
of human rights and political reform in China. We
have tried private diplomacy, public criticism, and
economic sanctions—none of which have had particularly
satisfying results. Human rights of all kinds in China—civil,
political, women's, religious, and ethnic—remain among
the most restricted in the world. The issue is a difficult
one because Chinese and Americans approach it from
different perspectives. Americans see a stultifying
authoritarian government that denies—sometimes brutally—universal
rights and freedoms; many Chinese counter that economic
and social rights are more important than political
freedoms, and that the economic progress of the last
25 years therefore represents an impressive advance
of human rights. The growth in economic openness presents
an opportunity for human rights in China—as new people
and ideas flow across the Chinese border, the potential
for accompanying political and social change grows.
But until there is real political change in China,
human rights will persist as a glaring concern for
Americans and American policymakers.
Security
Other areas of concern for Chinese and American policymakers
are principally in the security arena. Chief among
these is the future of Taiwan, which remains the most
volatile point of tension in the US-China relationship.
China has been persistent in its claim on Taiwan,
simultaneously pursuing military buildups across the
Taiwan Strait and closer links in commerce and trade
with the island. The United States formally embraces
a "one-China" policy, and, despite statements made
early in the Bush Administration, we have generally
maintained strategic ambiguity with regard to Taiwan—we
have dissuaded Taiwan from declaring independence,
while keeping China guessing about a US response to
an unprovoked Chinese offensive.
Taiwan arouses passionate and historically rooted
sentiment on both sides, and this has periodically
led to inflamed rhetoric and escalated tensions. A
principal goal on both sides has been—and should remain—the
avoidance of military conflict over Taiwan. The United
States should avoid provoking China over Taiwan, and
China should not pursue military coercion in seeking
to unify the island with the mainland. The future
of Taiwan remains in question, but it is a question
that should be worked out quietly—not through war,
but through negotiation, commerce, and the passage
of time.
 Another
area of concern between the United States and China
has been in weapons technology and proliferation.
China is one of a few nations with the ability to
inflict great nuclear harm on the United States, and
has pursued a minimum nuclear deterrence capability.
The United States has also accused China of exporting
dangerous weapons and missile technology to countries
like Pakistan and North Korea. Tensions have ebbed
somewhat, as the 1990s saw the successful incorporation
of China into several nonproliferation regimes, and
China has recently announced a plan to limit its exports
of missiles and other dual-use technologies. But US
plans to build a missile defense system and China's
goal of upgrading its nuclear capability ensure difficult
times ahead. China will be provoked by any US attempt
to eliminate its deterrence capability through a missile
shield, while the United States will oppose a nuclear
arms buildup in East Asia. Potential flashpoints such
as the Korean peninsula and Taiwan could further complicate
the situation. Dialogue between the military and civilian
leadership of both nations is necessary to ensure
that misunderstanding and mistrust do not escalate
into something more dangerous.
The potential for a successful and sustained dialogue
has been somewhat strengthened since the war on terrorism
recast the US-China relationship. The common strategic
concern of terrorism has led to tangible cooperation:
Chinese support for the US-led campaign in Afghanistan,
intelligence-sharing, and US support for the Chinese
crackdown on Islamic separatists in China's western
territories. There is also a warmer tone between the
two nations as of the end of 2002, as the United States
has renewed military-to-military ties, and China supported
the United Nations resolution on Iraq and has pledged
cooperation in defusing the crisis in North Korea.
PRC President Jiang Zemin made it a priority to demonstrate
enhanced relations and cooperation between the United
States and China in the war on terror as China moved
toward a change in leadership. In the coming months
and years, incoming President Hu Jintao and the new
Chinese leadership must resolve internal differences—if
any—and formulate their own approach to the United
States and foreign policy. It remains to be seen how
this approach will differ from Jiang's approach, and
to what extent Jiang will remain involved in diplomatic
and security matters. For the time being, China seems
to have accepted the reality of US preeminence, and
the Bush Administration has decided to focus on working
with China on areas of common concern.
Building on a strong, yet uncertain,
foundation
The war on terror has put the Sino-American relationship
on more solid footing, but the potential for a negative
turn remains. One event, such as the downed spy plane
or a statement by Taiwan's President Chen Shui-bian
in favor of independence, could swing relations in
the other direction. This instability remains a flaw
in the relationship, and in US policy toward China
in general.
The United States must have a multifaceted policy
toward China because of the diversity of US interests
regarding China. Too many Americans tend to think
about the US-China relationship in terms of a single
issue, such as trade, Taiwan, or human rights. Without
diminishing the importance of these specific issues,
American policymakers should not allow any one of
these issues to dominate, drive, or derail the entire
relationship. With so many questions ahead, there
will surely be difficult times and differences of
opinion. China is a vast and diverse country and economy,
with a future that may be marked by both development
and upheaval. If we pursue a policy that reflects
the breadth of common interests between the two nations,
then we can avoid the tumult that has afflicted relations
between the two nations over the last 30 years.
The United States should always speak up for its interests
and values in dealing with China—in commerce, international
security, and human rights. But we should not fear
a strong and prosperous China—the surest way to make
China an enemy is to treat it as one. Despite serious
and persistent differences, China and the United States
have been able to construct a relationship that has
benefited both countries and increased the stability
of Asia and the world. Expanded ties and cooperation
allow a flow of ideas that can break down mistrust
and misunderstanding of China in the United States,
while encouraging growth and, potentially, political
change within China.
The future of China is the great unknown of the twenty-first
century. The vital task for the United States is to
encourage China to move toward greater prosperity,
freedom, and international cooperation, while acknowledging
China's important and evolving role in the world.
The United States and China continue to alternate
between connecting and colliding on a great many issues.
If both sides commit themselves to engagement, then
the United States and China can build on the foundation
of the last 30 years to forge a relationship characterized
by depth, candor, and common interest.
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Lee
H. Hamilton
is director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars in Washington, DC.
He served as a member of the US House of Representatives
from Indiana for 34 years
and as chair and ranking member of the House Committee on
International Relations and the Joint Economic Committee. |
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| March-April
2003 THE CHINA BUSINESS REVIEW |
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Copyright 1997-2008
by The China Business Review
All rights reserved.
Last Updated:
07-Mar-2003
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