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Once in a While, Less is More A new dimension of US-China relations-- "reciprocal unilateralism" - could emerge in the coming year Robert A. Kapp

In case you haven't noticed, we are in a moment of calm on the US-China front. How long it will last is uncertain. Unless somebody does something sufficiently imaginative to break out of the annual Most Favored Nation-driven cycle of recrimination, we'll soon see fireworks again, perhaps even before the winter of 1998 is over. While things are quiet, let's contemplate the year past and the way ahead.

1997 highlights

• After months of bitter debate laced with very domestic politics, the US House of Representatives sustained normal US tariffs (MFN rates) on Chinese goods by a decisive margin. An attempt to scuttle MFN in the Senate was quickly defeated. Late in the year, the House passed in a few days a raft of China-focused bills. Prospects of enactment into law in 1998 are at best cloudy.

• Hong Kong reverted to Chinese sovereignty with essentially none of the dire eventualities that had sparked a year-long feeding frenzy in the American media and unending discussion in the US political realm. Since the handover, many Americans and others worldwide have remained vigilant, but Hong Kong has dropped almost completely from public view in the United States.

• The state visit of PRC President Jiang Zemin produced a number of commitments to improved bilateral cooperation, and a remarkable public event: the two presidents' sober public exploration of deeply divergent perspectives on human rights. Despite heavy US media concentration on points of US-China friction, the two leaders revealed an increasingly mature and manageable relationship between proud but very different societies.

• Bureaucratic engagement between the two governments began to expand, in ways that will assist the continuing normalization of US-China cooperation. Already, cabinet- and subcabinet-level engagements are increasing.

• Following the conclusion of the state visit, Wei Jingsheng, regarded by many as China's most prominent prisoner of conscience, was released from penal custody and came to the United States for medical care. Wei's release had been heavily emphasized by leading US human rights organizations and critics of US-China rapprochement; some had urged that the state visit not proceed unless Wei was freed.

• Shortly after the summit, during the Vancouver Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum meetings, China presented US negotiators with a new proposal on World Trade Organization (WTO) accession. American officials have called it a serious step forward.

• China moved ahead on key questions of political leadership, and reforms in the crucial area of State-owned enterprise restructuring have already begun to lurch forward at the grass-roots level.

The year-end evidence thus suggests that the PRC and US administrations have taken a publicly observable stake in the benefits of civil and respectful engagement, in spite of voices in each nation demanding that the other country be treated as an implacable strategic adversary.

Signs of "reciprocal unilateralism"

Under reciprocal unilateralism, the two sides maintain a very direct, thorough, continuous, and businesslike policy dialogue, generally away from the headlines and the "bully pulpit," so that each side has a solid understanding of the other's priorities and most sensitive concerns.

When the ongoing, formal bilateral dialogue produces formally negotiated agreements whose public affirmation is acceptable to both sides, the two governments announce and ink their achievements together.

Significantly for the long-term handling of bilateral differences, however, each side also takes unilateral steps to address the other's urgent concerns. Moreover, without detailed elaboration, each side responds to positive gestures with something positive of its own.

These reciprocal unilateral moves take place with no formal agreements, no joint statements, and no explicit acknowledgment of linkages. As they accumulate, however, the end results are a progressive removal of irritants and improvement of the "operating system" of US-China relations overall.

In terms of process, this may not be to the taste of all Americans. Some would prefer bankable proof that their own efforts have caused China to modify its policies or practices. In extreme cases, the value seems to lie more in the public credit to be earned than in the concrete results to be achieved.

Advocates of a bright-spotlight strategy of public exposure and high-profile demands are probably right in maintaining that pressure is an intrinsic element in the US-China relationship. But yearning for that comforting assurance that one's own actions directly caused a desired change for the better in China is almost always an exercise in futility.

For achieving real results, the reciprocal unilateral style may turn out to be unexpectedly productive. The evidence of the past year suggests that a decision to maintain a real working relationship at the leadership level, after many years of deep doubt, has now been established in both countries. This relationship can allow each side to address the concerns and needs of the other without requiring in every case the official agreements and explicit linkages that formal bilateralism entails. Such a possibility does not mea n the end of all differences of position between the United States and China. Like official bilateral commitments, reciprocal unilateral moves can entail domestic political risks.

Reciprocal unilateralism assumes three things. First, it assumes maintenance of very strong, laborious but effective communication between the two administrations. This in turn demands a willingness to commit precious time and attention to a dialogue that will tax the resources of both sides.

Second, reciprocal unilateralism demands consistent adherence to stable and durable priorities. If the two sides cannot dependably convey their priorities to each other, no amount of agile maneuvering will suffice to sustain political confidence in the possibility of shared progress, and bitterness over "moving the goal posts" will wear away at bilateral relations.

Third, reciprocal unilateralism both requires and contributes to a sense of positive purpose and forward movement even in the face of inevitable storms and controversies. Reciprocal unilateralism must bring results in sensitive areas one step at a time, but it is the cumulative pattern that counts. If momentary crises perpetually threaten to derail the process, real progress will not be sustainable. Forces within each society might prefer derailment. Nevertheless, to continue the analogy, while a string of burning tank cars on a rail siding in a populated area might be a great marketing op portunity for gas-mask manufacturers, it doesn't do much for the local citizenry.

The way forward

At the core of the formal bilateral agenda in 1998 should be the PRC's WTO accession and its companion, elimination of the wasteful annual US renewal of China's normal tariff status. Though we've said this before, recent signs of progress have once again suggested that a genuinely acceptable agreement between the United States and China, prerequisite to broader WTO agreement on China's accession, may finally be edging within the two leaders' grasp. The two sides now know each other's positions well, and the two nations' leaders have apparently blessed further progress in this key area. Expeditious conclusion of the nearly endless WTO haggle, on economically legitimate terms, is far and away the biggest concern of US business at the formal bilateral level.

The way forward should also see the further development of long-term bilateral cooperation in such areas as the extension of international legal procedural norms, under conditions in which neither side is the demander and neither is the target.

The way forward should see additional reciprocal unilateralist steps in areas of great sensitivity. This is as significant as required progress in formal bilateral settings. Already, the two sides have begun to show that they can make these gestures. There is no need to elaborate the issues here or to propose a specific tit-for-tat formula. The gathering record should speak for itself.

Finally, the way forward must be just that--a path to progress. Standing still is equivalent, bicycle-style, to falling over. If the two sides have decided to invest in the rebuilding of a crucial global relationship, it will not do to lose concentration, or to stow the follow-up plans in the back of the drawer.

In the US-China arena, 1997 ended more positively than it began. Look for more drums and cymbals in 1998, but hopefully for further nuanced progress on the reciprocal unilateral front--and ideally for resolution at last on WTO as well.