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SAFE and Sound

Beijing tightens foreign-debt controls and encourages foreign direct investment in the face of the Asian financial crisis

T.K. Chang

A conspicuous irony of the Asian financial crisis for China investors is that the general non-convertibility of the renminbi (RMB), about which foreign investors have long complained, has in fact enabled China to escape the regional turmoil relatively unscathed. Moreover, Beijing's past policy of strict foreign-exchange controls, and its dogged insistence that Sino-foreign joint ventures balance their foreign exchange and meet export quotas or targets, have helped China amass one of the world's largest reserves of foreign exchange. World leaders now look to China, and PRC Premier Zhu Rongji, to help lift Asia out of its economic doldrums.


A conspicuous irony of the Asian financial crisis for China investors is that the general non-convertibility of the renminbi (RMB), about which foreign investors have long complained, has in fact enabled China to escape the regional turmoil relatively unscathed. Moreover, Beijing's past policy of strict foreign-exchange controls, and its dogged insistence that Sino-foreign joint ventures balance their foreign exchange and meet export quotas or targets, have helped China amass one of the world's largest reserves of foreign exchange. World leaders now look to China, and PRC Premier Zhu Rongji, to help lift As ia out of its economic doldrums.

In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, the PRC leadership has responded by adjusting China's policies on foreign debt and foreign direct investment (FDI), as well as its timetable for full convertibility of the RMB. Since mid-1997, Beijing has passed a number of regulations that further tighten government controls over foreign-currency debt obligations and that grant incentives aimed at attracting FDI. Among these are regulations issued by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) that strengthen its control over international commercial borrowings, the issuance of foreign-currency bonds, and the overall foreign-debt exposure of Chinese entities; and that tighten restrictions over collateral security provided to foreign lenders and the establishment by PRC entities of overseas foreign-exchange accounts.

Rather than take on short-term foreign debt, a primary cause of the crises in other Asian countries, China is promoting FDI. Beijing restored the tax exemption revoked in 1996 for the import by foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) of certain types of capital equipment (see The CBR, March-April 1998, p.4). Unlike foreign debt or portfolio investment, FDI cannot be defaulted upon or accelerated, and is generally illiquid and difficult to shift quickly out of the country. PRC leaders finally seem to be realizing the increasing indispensability of FDI to China's future econ omic growth, and the significant role that it has already played in China's modernization.

Postponed convertibility

Prior to Asia's financial implosion in 1997, China's leaders appeared to be targeting an aggressive timetable for making the RMB a fully convertible currency. To that end, the PRC government declared in 1996, several years ahead of the original target date, that the country's currency was convertible for current-account transactions, making the RMB officially convertible for profit repatriation and trade in goods and services. PRC officials also have offered to abolish foreign-exchange balancing requirements and export quotas for FIEs in connection with the country's bid to join the World Trade Organization (WTO). Combined with the PRC's rapidly growing foreign-exchange reserves, which topped $140 billion in 1997, these moves suggested that convertibility of the RMB for capital account transactions was perhaps a realistic goal by the year 2000.

But the financial crisis halted progress on full RMB convertibility. Despite mounting bad debts and an ailing banking sector, the non-convertibility of the RMB shielded the currency from speculative attacks by world financial markets. As a result, Beijing is likely to enforce tighter foreign-exchange controls, making full convertibility of the RMB a more distant prospect.

SAFE tightens debt controls

The financial problems in Indonesia, Tha iland, and South Korea illustrated the dangers of uncontrolled borrowing of foreign currencies by non-sovereign borrowers. For example, Indonesia's more than $65 billion in outstanding private-sector debt--a level much higher than ever previously suspected--remained hidden until more than five months after the outbreak of the financial crisis. China, on the other hand, has generally exercised caution in restricting enterprises and local entities from incurring foreign debt, primarily by requiring government approval for foreign-exchange transactions.

But a number of analysts and international organizations believe that official PRC statistics underreport the country's true level of foreign indebtedness. Official PRC statistics show utilized foreign bank commercial loans in the first 11 months of 1997 of only $904 million. Records of the Bank of International Settlements, however, indicate a debt load of $86 billion in June 1997, up from $75 billion in June 1996. According to some analysts, offshore accounts of PRC entities may also have significant foreign-debt obligations that are not reflected in official figures.

To keep a lid on China's foreign indebtedness, SAFE issued the following regulations: the Procedures for the Administration of the Borrowing of International Commercial Loans by Domestic Institutions (the International Loans Procedures), Procedures for the Administration of Foreign Currency Bond s by Domestic Institutions (the Foreign Bonds Procedures), Implementing Rules for the Statistical Monitoring of Foreign Debts (the Debt Monitoring Implementing Rules), Implementing Rules to the Procedures for the Administration of the Provision of Security to Foreign Entities by Domestic Institutions (the Foreign Security Implementing Rules), and Provisions on the Administration of Overseas Foreign Exchange Accounts (the Forex Accounts Provisions). These regulations, which took effect January 1, supersede or supplement previous regulations, and increase government control over foreign-exchange transactions, either by tightening the requirements for such transactions or by extending the coverage of the regulations over previously unregulated transactions.

Revitalizing foreign investment

Beijing has also sought to bolster declining foreign investment levels by reinstating the tariff and tax exemptions in conjunction with the issuing of a revised Guiding Catalogue for Foreign Investment in Industry. China's falling FDI receipts stem, in part, from continuing economic problems in other Asian countries, which traditionally accounted for a significant portion of China's foreign-investment inflows, and the removal of foreign-investment incentives. Beijing had revoked the tariff exemptions enjoyed by FIEs because Chinese economists had argued that excessive FDI was, in part, responsible for the high inflation in the early 1990s, and that such exemptions gave FIEs an unfair advantage over PRC enterprises. The FIE exemptions prompted many PRC enterprises to cycle funds through their overseas subsidiaries and establish false FIEs to make "round-trip" investments, taking advantage of the FIE tariff exemptions.

Such arguments prompted Beijing to revoke tariff and duty exemptions for all capital imports of FIEs approved on or after April 1, 1996. Ironically, PRC officials claimed the move represented the government's commitment to honor requests by the United States and other Western members of the WTO to provide FIEs "national treatment," that is, treatment equal to that given to PRC domestic enterprises.

The effects of removing the tariff exemptions on foreign investment in China were not readily apparent in 1996, in part because foreign companies had accelerated their capital import timetables to beat the various deadline phases. But the precipitous drop--by more than a quarter--in China's contracted FDI in 1997 caught Beijing's attention. PRC leaders, realizing that already slowing foreign-investment inflows would likely drop further as a result of the Asia n financial crisis, responded by restoring the tariff exemptions, effective January 1, 1998.

Although China has so far avoided the worst ravages of the Asian financial crisis, it shares many of the systemic ills of its Asian neighbors, including massive nonperforming bank portfolios, fragile financial institutions, and an overbuilt property sector. China faces potentially massive layoffs resulting from the reform of the State-owned enterprise sector. China's post-Deng leadership will perhaps need to implement more fundamental reforms to both the Chinese economy and the Chinese political system--beyond just controls on foreign debt and incentives for direct investment--to stem the tide of recession and deflation, and the accompanying societal pressures, that seem to be sweeping across Asia.

T.K. Chang is a lawyer with an international law firm in Hong Kong who has negotiated investment transactions in China since 1981.


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Last Updated: 9-Jul-98