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Again the Crossroads

Stability and forward momentum in US-China relations are at the foundation of this country's long-term interests

Robert A. Kapp

As predicted (by me, anyway), the United States is again at the crossroads on relations with China. At least, inside the Beltway we are. The gloomy springtime pattern has reappeared: sensational leaks to the press of unproven allegations, followed by media frenzy mixing separate stories into a single heady brew, followed by political furor over the media stories, followed by a rush to legislate new sanctions and prohibitions aimed both at China and US economic relations with the PRC.

The high point for me of this year's eruption: a press release from one political organization, containing a bitter diatribe against American engagement policy toward China, which closed by saying, "For more information, contact____. For sound bites, contact____" (emphasis added).

The media tell me that the average sound bite has dropped from 21 seconds to 7 seconds in recent years. So if a broadcaster needs 7--or 10 or 15--seconds of "sound" on US-China policy, he or she need only call the listed phone number to get the right bite, and Voila! If you like "talk radio," you'll love "talk foreign policy"!

And yet, for all the excitement, there is surprisingly little that is new and fresh in all this. Structurally, at least, it's mostly replay, and when the dust settles it will be seen as such. The unique elements of the 1998 situation, perhaps, are that the President of the United States is paying a visit to China (the first in nine years, following the positive visit of the Chinese president to the United States last fall), and that a close congressional election looms in the autumn.

So again, as expected, we're at the crossroads. Will China's Most Favored Nation (MFN) status go down? Will the upcoming summit "fail," i.e., end in mutual disappointment and recrimination? Will decades of broadly continuous US policy, across four administrations, abruptly shift, taking down with them any prospects of further improvement in American-Chinese cooperation after a couple of years of hard-won progress? Will another round of internal demon hunting bring down a policy or even an Administration?

Don't bet on it. Here's why:

• Knocking off $80 billion in trade and crippling $25 billion in US investment by axing MFN is not kid stuff, and everyone knows it. To their great credit, the Speaker of the House and the chairmen of the House Ways & Means Committee and its Trade Subcommittee pledged to work with the President to uphold MFN, on the very day that the President announced his intention to renew it. Heated rhetoric there will be, but the signs at mid-June are increasingly positive, at least on the narrow issue of MFN.
      On MFN, we must again work very, very hard to make our message heard: that stability and forward momentum in US-China relations are at the foundation of this country's long-term interests, and that maintaining normal trade relations is simply a pit stop, a routine but essential prerequisite to successful pursuit of vital long-term national goals.

• Opening salvoes aside, there are many in Congress, in the general public, and in the media who prefer to know before they act and to act on the basis of their knowledge. The month of May witnessed a deluge of allegations and accusations related to American engagement with China and to China's own conduct. Legislative measures bloomed like desert flowers after a squall.
      Investigations into sensitive matters are now under way. Findings of fact are required. Public disclosure of the findings--in detail, and not simply in politicized, second-hand interpretations--is essential. While some advocates in the media have long since formed and published their conclusions, most interested Americans await a clearer understanding of the truth. Legally constituted US institutions will function as they are designed to function, and knowledge will finally replace allegation and rumor. Policymakers, in the end, will wait for that truth to emerge--and to emerge publicly--before deciding whether to turn US relations with China upside down.

• The futility of the "shut the door and turn off the lights" approach to China has always been clear, and is as clear as ever. Only the uninformed or the opportunistic can maintain that a long-term war of political and economic attrition against China will force China to act as Americans might wish to see it act. Does anyone seriously believe that denying entry visas to Chinese officials, or putting tariffs on Chinese products up from 5-6 percent to 70-80 percent, is the way to encourage China to act with greater regard for American preferences?

• The breadth of American interests with China will resurface in all but the most tightly sealed minds. US-China relations are not one-dimensional. US interests with China include Asia's regional economic stability; management of the volatile Korean Peninsula situation; further responsible PRC participation in rules-based global systems such as the World Trade Organization; intensified cooperation on nonproliferation; further convergence of views on human rights and related issues; strengthened cooperation on globe-threatening environmental problems; and swift and effective co mmunication on sensitive and urgent global concerns. The economic benefits of rapidly expanding trade with China are found in every US state, county, city, and town. The flow of scholarship and ideas, artistic trends, and educational relationships between American and Chinese colleagues is massive and important.

Finally, the instinct of most Americans, in this open and broadly based society, is to get acquainted with others, not to slam the door in others' faces. Domestic social strains notwithstanding, Americans on the coasts and in the heartland look outward with a greater sense of interest and of opportunity than they are sometimes given credit for doing. Perhaps that is one reason that, in election after election, the linked themes of foreign threat and domestic treachery haven't pulled decisive weight since the height of the early Cold War.

So, in spite of this year's China flap; of the tubs of ink again pouring from the attack media; of the fuzzy logic and the overheated rhetoric; and of the seductions of the sound bite, we should be optimistic at the crossroads. We should work for, and expect, the best from our government and ourselves. We should fight for, and try to ensure, stability and civility in the long-term American encounter with China. Our Chinese friends, in turn, should bet on the best in the United States as well, recognizing that they, too, bear responsibility for the choices ahead: progress, stagnation, or an unnecessary retreat into disillusionment. If the chips fall as I expect them to, we will look back on mid-1998 as a stormy moment, not as a time when the international climate changed for good and the glaciers of a new Cold War began to advance.

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